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ABSTRACT
The number and variety of Internet-connected devices have grown
enormously in the past few years, presenting new challenges to
security and privacy. Research has shown that network adversaries
can use traffic rate metadata from consumer IoT devices to infer
sensitive user activities. Shaping traffic flows to fit distributions
independent of user activities can protect privacy, but this approach
has seen little adoption due to required developer effort and over-
head bandwidth costs. Here, we present a Python library for IoT de-
velopers to easily integrate privacy-preserving traffic shaping into
their products. The library replaces standard networking functions
with versions that automatically obfuscate device traffic patterns
through a combination of payload padding, fragmentation, and
randomized cover traffic. Our library successfully preserves user
privacy and requires approximately 4 KB/s overhead bandwidth
for IoT devices with low send rates or high latency tolerances. This
overhead is reasonable given normal Internet speeds in American
homes and is an improvement on the bandwidth requirements of
existing solutions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the devices that comprise the Internet
of Things have been growing in number and variety. According
to Business Insider, there will be 24 billion IoT devices in use by
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2020 [7]. While the potential benefits of these devices are well
documented, they can also adversely impact personal security and
privacy.
IoT devices often perform very specific functions, making them
vulnerable to attackers seeking to infer details about potentially
private user behaviors. Apthorpe et al. [2] showed that an adversary
with access to IoT device traffic flows can detect when user events
occur, even when all traffic is encrypted, simply by looking for
peaks in traffic send and receive rates. User events differ across IoT
devices and can reveal specific information about user activities. A
user event for a sleep monitor, for example, usually indicates that
a user has fallen asleep or woken up. If adversaries know device
identities, they can deduce information about what users are doing
inside their homes.
Past research has indicated that traffic shaping by independent
link padding (ILP) can protect user privacy from this activity infer-
ence privacy risk [2]. If a traffic flow is shaped so that its send and
receive rates (packet send times and sizes) are completely indepen-
dent of user events, then these rates necessarily leak no information
about user behavior. Proposed router-based traffic shaping imple-
mentations [2] can protect all IoT devices in the home from an ISP
or other WAN observer without requiring device developer coop-
eration. However, router-based solutions do not protect against
WiFi observers, such as next-door neighbors or other malicious
devices in the home, and require technical knowledge by everyday
consumers to set up and manage.
In this paper, we present a Python library that IoT device devel-
opers can use to incorporate ILP traffic shaping directly into their
devices with minimal effort and for minimal cost. The library re-
places Python’s existing socket library and send()/recv() functions
with new versions that automatically obfuscate device traffic pat-
terns through a combination of packet buffering, payload padding
and fragmentation, and randomized cover traffic. Developers can
call our library’s functions to send information between their de-
vices and cloud servers. Our send() function manipulates packet
sizes and interpacket intervals, drawing their values from prede-
termined probability distributions. Our receive() function discards
cover traffic and recombines fragmented messages. Our library’s
familiar interface makes it easy for developers to incorporate into
existing code. Because the library must be used by both the sender
and receiver, we imagine that the library will be the most useful
for devices that communicate only with servers controlled by the
device manufacturer.
Our library is currently tailored to 2 different categories of de-
vices based on network behavior with fine-tuning parameters that
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developers can adjust. The first category includes devices that tol-
erate long latencies in cloud server communications without sacri-
ficing usability. The second category includes devices that produce
little network traffic overall. These categories of devices are the
most amenable to low-cost ILP traffic shaping and cover a broad
range of IoT products. We evaluate the overhead cost of traffic
shaping with our library when applied to traffic traces from real
consumer IoT devices. We find that use of the library results in
approximately 4 KB/s of overhead bandwidth per device, which is
acceptable given US internet speeds.
Our library also provides several improvements over router-
based traffic shaping. First, on-device shaping does not rely on the
ability to install a custom solution on a home router. Second, it
provides developers with tools to customize user data obfuscation
for their device characteristics instead of providing a generic so-
lution at the router level that is applied to all devices. Third, our
library prevents long delays that could affect device functionality.
Fourth, while traffic shaping performed at the router does not pro-
tect against an attacker who is sniffing wireless traffic in the home,
our library protects against this threat by obfuscating traffic before
it leaves the device.
The library is available at https://github.com/TrishaDatta/
PrivacyPreservingTrafficObfuscation [4].
2 RELATEDWORK
Our primary motivation is to prevent attackers from using en-
crypted IoT device traffic to infer user events that would violate the
privacy of homeowners. Apthorpe et al. recently showed that by
looking for peaks in traffic flow patterns, attackers can detect user
events for many different kinds of IoT devices, even when traffic
is encrypted [2]. Their threat model consisted of an attacker with
abilities similar to an ISP, who can observe Internet traffic in and
out of a smart home. The attacker’s goal is to identify IoT devices
inside the home and infer user behaviors from traffic rates. We
assume the same threat model in this paper.
Previous work has explored how to protect user anonymity from
traffic flow analysis. Most solutions in this space rely on either
independent link padding (ILP) or dependent link padding (DLP)
[5, 6, 8, 9]. ILP forces traffic to fit a predetermined distribution by
padding and fragmenting packets and sending cover packets. DLP
also uses padding, fragmentation, and cover traffic but uses some
information from the real traffic flow to set the schedule for packet
sending. Forcing traffic to fit pre-specified distributions is one of
the primary tools we use in our solution.
The two main parameters of ILP and DLP are packet sizes and
interpacket delays. Past work has explored how these two variables
can best be altered to protect user privacy. Dyer et al. have shown
that simply padding or fragmenting packet lengths to a constant
size is not sufficient for hiding user activity [5], and Fu et al. have
shown that variable interpacket delays obfuscate user activity better
than constant interpacket delays [6]. Past research has also shown
that DLP can preserve anonymity in systems susceptible to traffic
flow analysis attacks [8, 9]. However, as pointed out by Apthorpe
et al. [2], because these DLP algorithms preserve the relative rela-
tionships between time intervals with high rates of traffic and time
intervals with low rates of traffic, the attack we are concerned with
would still be feasible.
3 THREAT MODEL & TARGET DEVICES
Our threat model assumes that the adversary knows which IoT
devices are in a house, the identity (e.g., MAC addresses) of the IoT
device, and the sizes and times of the packets each device sends. We
assume that all packet payloads are encrypted. The adversary’s goal
is to determine when user events occur. This goal is intentionally
broad in order to encompass many different kinds of devices. For
example, a user event for a sleep monitor might be someone falling
asleep or waking up.
We split smart home devices into three categories based on their
network behavior:
(1) High-latency devices
(2) Low-latency low-bandwidth devices
(3) Low-latency high-bandwidth devices
The functionality of “high-latency” devices is not affected by longer
network delays, while “low-latency” devices require fast round trip
times for acceptable performance. For example, a sleep monitor is a
high-latency device because its functionality does not rely on quick
server responses. Conversely, a light switch that can be turned on
and off by an app is a low-latency device; the user expects minimal
delay between app interaction and the bulb turning on or off.
We further divide low-latency devices into high-bandwidth and
low-bandwidth categories based on the amount of traffic they send
during user events. Note that we have not defined a hard line
between categories. Developers who feel that their devices may
straddle two categories may want to try our solution for each
category and see which works best for their devices.
In this paper, we focus only on high-latency devices and low-
latency low-bandwidth devices. These categories include many
smart home devices that perform specialized functions, such as
sleep monitors, embedded sensors, motion detectors, lightbulbs,
and kitchen appliances. The user activity inference attack described
in [2] is particularly harmful for special purpose IoT devices. Net-
work traffic peaks from these devices imply specific user activities
without needing additional information. By creating a traffic shap-
ing library for these device categories, we can improve privacy for
a wide range of IoT devices.
Additionally, traffic from high-latency devices and low-latency
low-bandwidth devices is particularly amenable to traffic shaping.
These devices can either tolerate imposed delays or require less
cover traffic to mask user activities, respectively.
In contrast, the traffic from low-latency high-bandwidth devices
is difficult to shape without impacting useability or imposing exces-
sive overhead. Obfuscating user activities in traffic from these de-
vices requires either large amounts of cover traffic or a mechanism
to produce “fake” user events. The former is not ideal, especially
for users with data caps; the latter is challenging and the subject of
ongoing work outside the scope of this paper.
4 TRAFFIC SHAPING LIBRARY
Our library consists of a set of networking primitives that shape
traffic to distributions independent of user activities (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Overview of traffic obfuscation library.
This prevents attackers from inferring user activities from network
traffic patterns.
Our library performs traffic shaping in the sending direction by
padding payloads, fragmenting payloads, and adding cover packets.
Because we assume that traffic is encrypted, cover traffic consists
of random bytes. The send function adds 6-7 bytes of overhead (a
recovery header) indicating fragmentation and payload padding
details. This allows the receive function to discard cover traffic and
recover messages in their original form.
We implemented our library in Python because it is often used in
IoT development. The application-facing behavior of our library’s
send/receive functions are as similar to their standard Python coun-
terparts as possible. This will facilitate easier seamless integration
of our library into actual code. Users of our library can also provide
inputs to control padding and fragmentation parameters.
Our library allows developers flexibility when programming
their devices and does not interfere with device functionality or
user experience. It also gives developers a easy way to obfuscate
user data without relying on router-based or other in-network
protections. This places the burden of privacy protection on the
device developers rather than smart home owners.
4.1 Sender API Description
The sending API of our library is implemented as a Sender object
with the following methods:
(1) Sender.Sender(host, port, D, X) creates a TCP socket
between the sender and the receiver specified by host and
port.D andX specify parameters for the interpacket interval
and payload size distributions respectively. We also initialize
a message queue q.
(2) Sender.send(msg) adds msg to the message queue.
(3) Sender.startPeriodicallySending() starts the sending
of cover traffic. It should be called once before any calls
to Sender.send(msg). It starts a thread that implements
Algorithm 1.
(4) Sender.close() closes the socket. Because there might still
be messages in the queue, it waits until the queue is empty
Algorithm 1 ILP Traffic Shaping
while doSend do
d ⇐ Sample from distribution D
Pause for d seconds
x ⇐ Sample from distribution X
if q is not empty then
m ⇐ first message in q
len ⇐ size(m)
if len ≤ x then
Padm to x bytes.
else
Put last len − x bytes ofm at head of q
m ⇐ first x bytes ofm
end if
else
m ⇐ Random cover traffic of length x
end if
m ⇐m+ recovery header
Sendm
end while
(i.e., the separate thread has finished sending all messages
in the queue).
Because high-latency devices aremore tolerant of variable delays,
our high-latency solution uses random distributions for D and X .
For low-bandwidth low-latency devices, D and X are constants;
this enforces a constant sending rate. The developer must ensure
that the parameters D and X allow a send rate that is higher than
the rate at which the device would normally send data to prevent
functionality from being affected. There is thus a trade-off between
latency and overhead bandwidth.
4.2 Receiver API Description
Our receiving library is much simpler than our sending library
because the receiving side just reconstructs the original messages
using the recovery headers. There is only one function on the receiv-
ing side: recv(s, conn). It takes in the socket s and the connection
conn returned by s.accept() and returns the original messages
sent by the sending side. This function replaces conn.recv().
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate our traffic shaping library using two criteria: privacy
protection and overhead bandwidth.
5.1 Data Collection
We test the library with traffic collected from real IoT devices. The
traffic was collected as part of the work described in [2]. Ideally,
testing would involve deploying our library on multiple real IoT
devices. As an approximation, we use the collected traffic to sim-
ulate IoT device traffic using our library. The simulation involves
performing the following operations on each packet recorded from
each device:
(1) Extract the payload length and send time of each packet.
(2) Replay the traffic between two laptops on the same WiFi
network using our library’s send and receive functions.
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Figure 2: Top: Traffic flow from a Sense Sleep Monitor when
our library is not used. Bottom: Traffic flow from a Sense
Sleep Monitor with the effects of our library. Payload sizes
are drawn from a uniform distribution of [50, 200] bytes and
interpacket delays from a uniform distribution of [0, 0.6] sec-
onds.
(3) Record the resulting traffic between the laptops using Wire-
Shark.
(4) Repeat this procedure, experimenting with a range of pa-
rameters for each device to measure parameter effects on
bandwidth consumption.
5.2 Privacy Preservation Evaluation
Our library completely obfuscates user activity because payload
sizes and interpacket intervals are drawn from predetermined dis-
tributions independent of user activities. These features therefore
do not contain information that would allow an adversary to in-
fer user activities. Figures 2 and 3 show traffic from a Sense Sleep
Monitor, a high-latency device, and a Nestcam Security Camera in
low-latency low-bandwidth motion-detection mode, respectively,
with and without our library. Clearly, the shaped traffic does not
preserve user event peaks.
5.3 Bandwidth Consumption Evaluation
In this section, we examine how changing interpacket delay and
packet size distributions parameters affects overhead bandwidth
consumption.
5.3.1 High-Latency Device. The average rate of bandwidth con-
sumption for 200 seconds of traffic from a Sense Sleep Monitor
without the effects of our library is 143.78 bytes/second. We test
Figure 3: Top: Traffic flow from a Nestcam Security Camera
motion detectorwhen our library is not used.Bottom: Traffic
flow from a Nestcam Security Camera motion detector with
the effects of our library. The constant interpacket delay is
0.05 seconds, and the constant payload size is 120 bytes.
our library using a uniform interpacket delay distribution defined by
the interval [dlow ,dhiдh ]. Increasing eitherdlow ordhiдh decreases
the overhead bandwidth (Figure 4). This makes sense because we
are decreasing the rate at which packets are being sent. Increasing
average interpacket delay can increase the total time it takes to
send out all of the packets. However, because the sleep monitor is
a high-latency device, this is not a major concern.
We next test the effect of payload size distribution. We use a
uniform distribution defined by [slow , shiдh ]. Increasing either slow
or shiдh causes the amount of additional bandwidth required to
increase (Figure 5). Decreasing either slow or shiдh can increase the
total time it takes to send all of the packets. This delay increases as
the average payload size decreases and can add several seconds to
the overall time. However, because we are dealing with high-latency
devices, this is not a major concern. We also look at using a uniform
distribution versus a normal distribution for packet sizes (Figure 5).
We find that the average overhead bandwidth consumption is very
similar.
The range of parameters discussed in this section uses up to
approximately 1.5 KB/s in overhead bandwidth.
5.3.2 Low-Bandwidth Low-Latency Device. Developers can tune
two parameters when using our library for low-bandwidth low-
latency devices: the constant interpacket delay d and the constant
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Figure 4: The effects of changing dlow (top) and dhiдh (bot-
tom) on additional bandwidth consumed for a Sense Sleep
Monitor, a high-latency device.
payload size x . We examine the effect of changing both of these
parameters on overhead bandwidth consumption for 200 seconds of
traffic from a Nestcam Security camera in motion detection mode.
The average bandwidth of this traffic without our library is 346.04
bytes/second. As could be expected, increasing the interpacket de-
lay decreases the average additional bandwidth, and increasing the
payload size increases the average additional bandwidth (Figure 6).
The range of parameters discussed in this section uses approxi-
mately 3.8 to 11 KB/s overhead bandwidth.
5.3.3 Discussion: Overhead Bandwidth Costs. In general, we can
find parameter settings that consume around 4 KB/s of overhead
bandwidth per device. This is a substantial improvement upon the
solution presented in [2], which used 40 KB/s of overhead band-
width for three devices. A device that requires 4 KB/s of overhead
bandwidth will require around 10.4 GB of overhead bandwidth a
month. This overhead is reasonable in the context of an Ameri-
can smart home. Comcast and Cox Communications, the largest
and third largest cable internet providers in the US by number of
subscribers [1], both have data caps of 1 TB/month and charge
an additional $10 for every additional 50 GB used [3]. The 10.4
GB/month per IoT device would only consume around 1% of a 1 TB
data cap.
Figure 5: The effects of changing slow (top) and shiдh (middle)
on additional bandwidth consumed for a Sense Sleep Moni-
tor, a high-latency device. Bottom: The effect of using a nor-
mal distribution vs. a uniform distribution for the payload
size distribution for a Sense Sleep Monitor, a high-latency
device.
6 CONCLUSION
The privacy and security issues involved with IoT devices will
only continue to proliferate as the number of IoT devices grows. In
this work, we present a Python library of networking primitives
that smart home device developers can use to help protect their
users’ privacy from adversaries attempting to infer user activities
from encrypted traffic. Our library uses random interpacket delays,
fragmented/padded messages, and cover traffic to force traffic to fit
predetermined distributions. The library is targeted towards smart
home devices with high latency tolerance or low bandwidth usage.
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Figure 6: The effects of changing the interpacket delay (top)
and payload size (bottom) on additional bandwidth con-
sumed for a Nestcam Security Camera Motion Detector, a
low-bandwidth low-latency device.
We evaluate our solutions on two criteria: privacy preservation
and additional bandwidth consumption. Our library preserves user
privacy because the resultant traffic flows are completely indepen-
dent of user activities. Our library also uses less than 4 KB/s of
overhead bandwidth for a wide range of parameters. This overhead
data usage is reasonable given the rate limits of typical U.S. homes
and is a substantial improvement on previous solutions.
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